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Abstract: We argue that the strengths of the Theory of Event Coding
(TEC) can usefully be applied to a wider scope of cognitive tasks, and
tested by more diverse methodologies. When allied with a theory of con-
ceptual representation such as Barsalou’s (1999a) perceptual symbol sys-
tems, and extended to data from eye-movement studies, the TEC has the
potential to address the larger goals of an embodied view of cognition.
The two main claims of the Theory of Event Coding (TEC), as we
see it, are the nature of perception-action relations and the role of
distal coding. The former claim is supported with data from ex-
periments that require overt behaviours, such as button presses,
in rapid response to reasonably simple stimuli. Yet if it is the case
that event codes are an important level of representation, then we
might expect them to contribute to more complex, conceptual
representations as well. Also, if common coding is indeed a key
principle of mental representation, then we should find evidence
of motor systems participating in a wide range of cognitive tasks.
Following these assumptions, we propose that the TEC should be
allied to broader theories of cognition such as Barsalou’s (1999a)
Perceptual Symbols Systems, and present several examples of how
the TEC can be extended into methodologies that use richer stim-
uli and more complex responses. We argue further that problems
associated with Hommel et al.’s second claim, regarding distal
coding, are alleviated by adopting an embodied view of the mind.
Barsalou’s (1999a) Perceptual Symbol Systems theory proposes
an account of conceptual representation as perceptual simulation,
or combinations of “perceptual symbols.” Although motor systems
are proposed to contribute to perceptual simulations, most of the
empirical evidence so far focuses on the modal, perceptual qual-
ity of conceptual representations. For example, Stanfield and
Zwaan (2001) showed that if a narrative implicitly describes an ob-
ject in a certain orientation (e.g., a nail hammered into the floor
versus the wall), an image of that object presented later will be
identified more quickly if it is in the same orientation. This sug-
gests that subjects construct a mental model or “perceptual simu-
lation” of the narrative that is specific to the level of object orien-
tation.
Recent work in our laboratory uses the framework of the TEC
to show that perceptual simulations of a spoken narrative may also
include “action codes” for potential motor interactions. In Exper-
iment 2 of Richardson et al. (2001), subjects heard a story which
mentioned an object with a one-sided affordance (e.g., a milk jug).
The orientation of the object was implied (e.g., “the milk jug
points towards the egg cup”). When subjects made a later judg-
ment about a different property of the object (e.g., “Is the jug in
the center of the table?”), there were interactions between the
left/right hand used to make the response, and the left/right af-
fordance of the imagined object. Thus, the mental representation
of the scene seems to evoke action codes for object affordances,
which then interact with manual responses. Moreover, the time
course of these interactions followed the pattern suggested by TEC
(sect. 3.2.2) such that early responses show stimulus-response
compatibility effects, and later responses show incompatibility ef-
fects (Stoet & Hommel 1999; Tucker & Ellis 1998).
However, the speed of a button press is only one, rather limited,
way to investigate the interaction between motor and cognitive
systems. Hommel et al. frequently allude to eye movements as a
concrete example of action continuously guiding perception, yet
they do not discuss the literature on eye movements and cognition
(e.g., Ballard et al. 1997). Work in our laboratory has shown how
oculomotor systems participate in the comprehension of spoken
scene descriptions (Spivey & Geng, in press; Spivey et al. 2000),
and the spatial indexing of linguistic information (Richardson &
Spivey 2000). In the latter work, we presented adults with audi-
tory semantic facts that co-occurred with visual events in four lo-
cations. When answering a question about one of the facts, sub-
jects made saccades to the (now empty) region of space associated
with that fact. Although location was task-irrelevant, adults tagged
auditory information with a spatial index (cf. Pylyshyn 2001). In
this way, even though they may be looking at a blank display, sub-
jects’ eye movements reveal a degree of oculomotor participation
in what is essentially a distal encoding of linguistic information.
Placing the TEC within the context of the embodied cognition
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also alleviates the metatheoretical concerns that Hommel et al.
raise in their Epilogue about the source of distal coding. From an
embodied perspective, the reason we do not see spikes traveling
along our nerves when we look at a flower is because those spikes
are the seeing. An embodied mind is one in which the entire sys-
tem, from sensors to effectors, participates in mental experience.
There is no subset region that one can point at and call “the mind
within the body.” Thus, when the TEC is combined with an em-
bodied view of cognition, the question of why coding is distal in-
stead of proximal fades away.
In conclusion, we see an increasing body of research that re-
veals a very tight coupling between perception and action. Within
the domain of reasonably simple, stimulus-response tasks, Hom-
mel et al. replace the idea of a perception-action arc with the el-
egant notion of event codes. We argue that this common coding
structure may also be employed in conceptual or linguistic repre-
sentation. If one views cognition from an embodied or situated
perspective (Barsalou 1999b; Clark 1997; Glenberg 1999; Lakoff
1999), then language comprehension is a matter of “preparation
for situated action.” In this framework, conceptual representa-
tions are contiguous with the representational forms of perception
and action. Therefore, with a broader perspective on cognition
and a wider set of empirical methodologies, the TEC provides the
theoretical mechanics for investigating the embodied nature of
cognition.
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